


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**CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES  
AT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF / UNIFIED COMMAND LEVEL**

BY

Lieutenant Colonel Benton H. Borum  
United States Army

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**CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES  
AT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF / UNIFIED COMMAND LEVEL**

**AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT**

by

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United States Army**

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## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Benton H. Borum, LTC, AV

TITLE: CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES AT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF  
STAFF / UNIFIED COMMAND LEVEL

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

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The U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Wargaming has a requirement for a concise "typical" example of the critical elements of information (CEI) required / employed by United States Unified Command headquarters for operational and / or strategic level decision making during the initial phases of crisis action procedures (CAP). The CEI example is required for computer based strategic / operational level war game exercises. This paper will develop such a CEI example, which is provided in both list and briefing slide example formats.

Date: 15 April 1992

## INTRODUCTION

This paper will postulate a "typical" list of critical elements of information (CEI) required at the Unified Command headquarters level during the initial phases of crisis action procedures (CAP). The following seven subject areas will be discussed which collectively and progressively result in a "typical" strategic / operational level CEI list.

- a. The Joint Operation Planning System as relating to CAP.
- b. The six CAP procedural phases.
- c. The communication systems supporting CAP.
- d. National Command Authority (NCA) / Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) CAP critical elements of information (CEI).
- e. Currently employed Unified Command headquarters CAP critical elements of information (CEI).
- f. National crisis decision quality considerations.
- g. Media considerations.

## JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING SYSTEM (JOPS)

The Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) is a DOD directed, JCS specified system to conduct joint planning during both peacetime and crises situations. It is an ordered and comprehensive set of procedures to translate an assigned task into a plan of operation. JOPS supports the strategic driven function of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and establishes procedures for developing, reviewing, and executing global and regional plans. It is oriented towards solving the complex strategic

mobility problems associated with combat force and combat service support strategic deployment and sustainment.<sup>1</sup>

The greatest modification to JOPS since its inception was the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The Congressional intent of that law was to clarify the command line from the NCA to the combatant commanders and to preserve civilian control of the military. The term combatant command means a unified or specified command. The commander of a combatant command is designated a Commander-in-Chief (CINC). The Goldwater-Nichols Act states that the operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and then to the combatant commanders. However, a provision of the Act permits the President to authorize communications from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands to pass through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). By that authority, DOD directive 5100.1 dated 25 September 1987 places the CJCS in the communications chain-of-command; thus CAP communications between the NCA and the combatant commander pass through CJCS. Also established by DOD Directive 5100.1 is wide latitude for the Secretary of Defense to assign oversight responsibilities to the CJCS to assist in the Secretary's control and coordination of the combatant commanders.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the U.S. strategic chain-of-command effectively runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense then to the CJCS and finally to the CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 2 (Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)) describes the "joint operational planning process" as a coordinated Joint Staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish an assigned mission.<sup>3</sup> The procedure is used by a combatant commander in either deliberate or crises action situations in order to determine the best method of accomplishing an assigned task, and to direct the actions necessary to accomplishment the mission. It outlines key elements that contribute to successful problem solving. The overall process includes procedures that allow consideration of factors that can significantly affect the accomplishment of the task, and that permit all staff components at every level of command to estimate the influence of all factors on every contemplated course of action.<sup>4</sup>

Unified and Specified Command headquarters employ the joint operations planning process to simultaneously develop both contingency plans and resource requirements. Two types of planning methods are utilized in this process. Requirements planning focuses exclusively on the combatant commander's analysis of a probable, future enemy threat or assigned task to which an effective response may not yet exist.<sup>5</sup> Capabilities planning attempts to confront a potential threat based upon the forces and support that have been funded by Congress in the current budget cycle.<sup>6</sup> Utilizing either method, eighteen to twenty-four months may be required to identify adequate responses, conduct the

evaluation to select the "best" course of action, and prepare a feasible deployment plan. Both types of joint planning procedures are continuous. Lastly, planning begins when a task is recognized or assigned and continues until the requirement for the plan is canceled or the plan is executed.<sup>7</sup> Thus, in a crisis situation some or all of a plan may already exist which to some degree addresses the situation.

#### CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES

In crisis situations where the time available to plan an operation is limited to only a few days; where the body of knowledge grows hourly from continuous intelligence updates; where timely identification of resources is necessary to ready a force, schedule transportation, and prepare supplies; and where actual movement and employment of U.S. Armed Forces is expected within the immediate future, the deliberate planning process will not suffice. An adequate and feasible military response in a crises demands flexible procedures keyed to the time available, to communications that are rapid and effective, and, whenever possible, to the use of previous planning.<sup>8</sup> In these crises and time sensitive situations, the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) uses Crises Action Procedures (CAP) as described in Joint Pub 5-02.4, JOPS (Joint Operations Planning System) Volume IV (Crisis Action Procedures)<sup>9</sup>, to adjust and implement previously prepared contingency plans, or to develop and execute operation orders where no useful contingency plan for the



evolving crisis exists (See APPENDIX A).<sup>10</sup> The Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as the commands and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, employment, support, and sustainment of forces in a theater of operations.<sup>11</sup> Crisis Action Procedures provide guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, combatant commanders, and defense agencies for developing timely recommendations to the NCA.<sup>12</sup> There are three products of JOPS - operation plans (OPLANS), contingency plans (CONPLANS), and, in the case of crisis action procedures, operation orders (OPORDs).<sup>13</sup>

#### CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES, PHASE I -

##### SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

In the course of monitoring the world situation an event of military relevance may occur that has possible security implications for the United States or its interests. When such an event is recognized by any element of the U.S. Government, it is reported to the National Military Command Center (NMCC), which directly supports the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C. The serious incident report is made in the CRITIC OPREP-3 PINNACLE format (APPENDIX B-1).<sup>14</sup> If the NCA determines that the event is in fact a threat to U.S. interests, crisis action procedures will begin immediately.<sup>15</sup> The supported commander, as designated by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense, has the primary responsibility for responding to a crisis, and is usually

the CINC of the unified command of the geographic area in which the crisis occurs.<sup>16</sup> Immediately upon learning of a possible crisis event within his theater of responsibility, a CINC provides an initial event report with as much information as possible about the nature of the crisis, the forces readily available, major constraints to possible force employment, and actions being taken, if any, within existing rules of engagement (ROE). As appropriate, the CINC's report also contains a succinct discussion of various courses of action (COAs) that his headquarters is considering or that he recommends.<sup>17</sup>

#### CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES, PHASE II -

##### CRISIS ASSESSMENT

Having received notification from the NMCC of a crisis, the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze the situation to determine whether a military option should be prepared to deal with the evolving problem. This phase ends with an NCA decision on whether to begin developing a military solution to the crisis for possible execution. <sup>18</sup>

#### CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES, PHASE III -

##### COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

Following an NCA decision to develop military options, CJCS normally authorizes the release of a Warning Order (APPENDIX B-2) directing the development of COAs in response to the crisis situation. The Warning Order also establishes command

relationships (designating supported and supporting commanders), states the mission, objectives, and known constraints, and advises all members of the JPEC of on-going planning efforts to include all current details. A tentative C-day and L-hour, the date and time that a strategic deployment operation is scheduled to commence, are also provided in the Warning Order, or the supported commander is requested to propose a C-day and L-hour. If a specific COA is already being considered by the NCA / CJCS, the Warning Order will be used to describe that COA and request the supported commander's assessment. The Warning Order establishes a deadline for a USTRANSCOM's response, the CINCTrans's Commander's Estimate. In extremely time sensitive situations the Warning Order may be issued orally or even omitted. If it contains force deployment preparation or deployment orders, Secretary of Defense approval is required for the Warning Order's release.<sup>19</sup> Lastly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct USCINCTrans to coordinate establishment of a crisis deployment WWMCCS Inter-computer Network (WIN) teleconference (TLCF) and identify those commands required to join and monitor the TLCF, provided that the supported commander has not already established a TLCF.<sup>20</sup>

In response to the CJCS Warning Order the supported commander utilizes the Joint Deployment System (JDS) to release an Evaluation Request message (APPENDIX B-3). JDS consists of personnel, procedures, directives, communication systems, and electronic data processing systems to directly support both

deliberate and crisis planning on a world wide basis. The Evaluation Request message tasks Service component commanders and supporting commanders for planning information to assist the supported Command in constructing courses of actions. Finally, the Phase III supported command's planning process results in a Commander's Estimate (APPENDIX B-4) being transmitted to both the CJCS and the rest of the JPEC. This message is an abbreviated version of the type of information contained in a Commander's Estimate prepared during the concept development phase of deliberate planning. It contains one or more possible COAs and the supported commander's recommendation.<sup>21</sup> USTRANSCOM reviews the proposed COAs for supportability and, as time permits, prepares deployment estimates for each COA.<sup>22</sup> Supported commander submitted COAs may contain versions of an existing Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) or Operation Plan (OPLAN). Existing CONPLANS and OPLANS are stored in the JDS database and are always available for planner review. For situations that have not been considered by prior planning, a NOPLAN situation is said to exist.<sup>23</sup>

When the NCA / CJCS issued Warning Order is omitted, a Planning Order (APPENDIX B-4) or Alert Order (APPENDIX B-6) may be issued. When issued in lieu of a Warning Order, the Planning or Alert Order will contain all necessary force size / composition, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information.<sup>24</sup>

## CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES, PHASE IV -

### COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION

CJCS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the JCS Joint Staff review and analyze the Commander's Estimate and USTRANSCOM deployment estimates and present COAs in order of priority to the NCA for their decision.<sup>25</sup> The NCA selects a COA and directs that execution planning begins.

On receipt of an NCA decision of a possible military course of action, CJCS issues an Alert Order (APPENDIX B-6) to the supported CINC and the JPEC advising them of the selected COA. The Alert Order formally communicates to the JPEC that the NCA has decided to develop in detail a military solution to the crisis.<sup>26</sup> With the authority of the Secretary of Defense, CJCS may also issue a Deployment Preparation Order (APPENDIX B-7) or even a Deployment Order (APPENDIX B-8) for immediate execution.

A Planning Order (APPENDIX B-5) may be issued by CJCS before an Alert Order (APPENDIX B-6) decision is rendered by the NCA. In this case the Planning Order is a message from the CJCS to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC that directs execution planning activities to begin before formal selection of a COA by the NCA. In extremely time sensitive situations the Planning Order may also be used in lieu of a Warning Order, which is normally issued during Phase III. When used in this manner the Planning Order will describe a specific COA, direct specific execution planning activities, and provide the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally

provided in a Warning Order. The Planning Order will normally not be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the Planning Order requires approval of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>27</sup> The intent of the Planning Order is to expedite execution planning and permit flexibility in response to fast breaking events while the NCA considers the situation.

In extremely time sensitive cases, the Alert Order may be omitted or issued in lieu of the normally Phase III issued Warning Order. When issued in lieu of a Warning Order, the Alert Order will contain the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in the Warning Order.<sup>28</sup>

#### CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES, PHASE V -

##### EXECUTION PLANNING

During Phase V the supported commander transforms the NCA selected COA into an Operation Order (OPORD) (APPENDIX B-9). This phase encompasses three major tasks: execution planning, force preparation, and deployability posture reporting.<sup>29</sup>

Throughout the execution planning phase the CINC continues to evaluate the crisis event and the disposition of assigned and available forces. He also continues to issue status reports to the NCA / CJCS as required, and to report the significant actions taken by his command within the existing Rules of Engagement (ROE). The supported CINC will assess the employment status and availability of theater transportation assets and his theater's

transportation infrastructure.<sup>30</sup> Changes to the original plan may be necessary due to late changing tactical and intelligence considerations, force and non-unit cargo availability, availability of strategic lift assets, and Port of Embarkation (POE) and / or Port of Debarkation (POD) capabilities. When firm force requirements and priorities are established, the supported commander notifies the JPEC that the force requirements are ready for resourcing. This signals force providing organizations and supporting commands and agencies to provide or update specific unit movement data in JDS for the first increment of movement, normally the first seven days of air movement and the first 30 days of sea movement. It also prompts the Service logistics and personnel agencies to adjust sustainment requirements based upon the most accurate assessments available.<sup>31</sup>

Based upon the supported commander's OPORD development and JPEC input USTRANSCOM coordinates necessary changes to strategic lift requirements. Schedules for air and sea movement are finalized. Again, transportation planning emphases is on the initial increment of movements - first seven days by air and first 30 days by sea.<sup>32</sup>

Throughout the execution planning phase the Joint Chiefs of Staff monitor the execution planning activities using JDS, and review the evolving supported commander's OPORD for adequacy and feasibility.<sup>33</sup> The phase ends with a decision by the NCA to either execute the OPORD, place it on hold, or cancel it pending crisis resolution by some other means.<sup>34</sup>

## CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES, PHASE VI -

### EXECUTION

The Execution Phase starts with the NCA decision to utilize military force to resolve the crisis by executing the supported commander's OPORD. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, reflecting the decision of the NCA as directed by the Secretary of Defense, publishes the Execution Order (APPENDIX B-10) which defines D-day, the day that the operation is scheduled to commence, allocates resources, and directs execution of the OPORD.<sup>35</sup> In extremely time sensitive situations the Execution Order may be the only message provided in a crisis. In such situations the CJCS ensures that the Execution Order contains the information normally provided by both the Warning and Alert Orders.<sup>36</sup>

### COMMUNICATIONS

Personnel excepted, information is the most valuable resource in the Army, and is especially so during a national level crisis. Moreover, as mobility and weapon system technology increasingly compress the time between warning and attack, so must the transmission and processing time of warning, intelligence, and operation order information be compressed.

Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, defines the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) as the system that provides the means for operational direction and technical administrative support involved in the functioning of



the chain of command and the controlling of U.S. military forces. WWMCCS furnishes a multi-path channel of secure communications to transmit tactical warning and intelligence information from the combatant commands to the President and Secretary of Defense, and the channel from them to give direction back to the combatant commanders. The system's goal is to establish effective connectivity among all key components of the defense organization.<sup>37</sup> WWMCCS possesses five major components:

- a. A secure, near instantaneous warning system.
- b. A voice and data communications network.
- c. A data collection and processing system.
- d. Executive aids to support key decision making.
- e. Communications facilities.

Within WWMCCS the National Military Command System (NMCS) is the priority component designed to support the NCA in the execution of their responsibilities. The NMCS provides the means by which the President and Secretary of Defense can expeditiously receive warning and intelligence upon which accurate and timely decisions can be made, the resources of the Military Departments applied, military missions assigned, and by which direction can be given to CINCs or commanders of other commands established by the NCA. Both the communication of warning and intelligence from all sources, and the communication of decisions and commands to military forces, require that the NMCS be the most responsive, reliable, and survivable system that can be provided with the resources available.<sup>38</sup>

As mentioned during the discussion of the six CAP phases, crisis action procedures use the ADP support provided by the Joint Deployment System (JDS). Through JDS the crisis action planner may build a force list by directly accessing combatant command plans prepared during deliberate planning, as well as a force module library that includes packages of combat forces with appropriate support and sustainment. Furthermore, COAs can be analyzed on WWMCCS with an executive computer simulation program called Modern Aids to Planning Program (MAPP).<sup>39</sup>

The C3 systems within the geographical areas of the combatant commands are configured and operated generally to meet the specific requirements of the respective command. However, their priority communications requirement is to support the NMCS.<sup>40</sup>

#### NCA / JCS CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

The National Military Command Center (NMCC) does not utilize a standard CEI format. Rather, a tailored CEI list is developed for each crisis situation.<sup>41</sup> However, during crisis action procedures, the NMCC Operations Directorate prepares and updates Crisis Action Books at least once a day for the Chairman and for such other key officials as required. The most usual list of personnel provided a designated Crisis Action Book is as follows:<sup>42</sup>

- a. SECDEF
- b. DEPSECDEF

- c. CJCS
- d. VCJCS
- e. Assistant CJCS
- f. Service Chiefs
- g. Director, Joint Staff
- h. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- j. J3 through J8

The Crisis Action Books are the focal point for recording pertinent information on all aspects of an on-going crisis situation, and are supported by all elements of the Joint Staff. The format for the Crisis Action Books, which in effect is the initial list of critical elements of information employed at the SECDEF / CJCS level for crisis action procedures, is the following:

- a. Joint or CJCS talking paper which is included for NSC meetings only.
- b. Supporting National Security Council Papers.
- c. Integrated Overview and Regional Force Capabilities, including U.S.
- d. Intelligence Summary and Analysis.
- e. Operations, i.e. U.S. force locations, reconnaissance, communications, etc.
- f. Logistics.
- g. Diplomatic Activity.
- h. Personnel Matters.
- i. Significant Press Comment.

j. Background Intelligence / Operation Data, i.e. maps, force comparison, ground deployments, airfield / port / facility data, weather, etc.

k. OPLAN Outline.

l. Current Messages In.

m. Current Messages Out.

n. War Powers Act considerations.

o. Miscellaneous.

In addition to Crisis Action Books the NMCC provides CAP information in two other formats, oral / specific and daily, formal briefings. Of the three, the formal briefings provide the most comprehensive and detailed information. The format for each formal briefing is unique to the crisis being addressed, tailored to the requirements of the SECDEF and CJCS. The most recent example of a SECDEF / CJCS formal briefing format is that which evolved during Operation DESERT SHIELD / STORM (See Appendix C).

#### UNIFIED COMMAND CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

CENTCOM: Per CENTCOM REG 525-15, upon the identification of a crisis situation within the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility the Current Operations Section of the CENTCOM J3 establishes a Crisis Action Team (CAT). That team immediately prepares and maintains current a number of identical message traffic books for key personnel review. The CAT also begins accruing information

in the following four subject areas, which constitutes CENTCOM's initial crisis action CEI:

- a. Situation.
- b. Intelligence.
- c. Communications support available.
- d. Immediate actions required (if any).

If the crisis being addressed in any way involves terrorist activities, a fifth subject area, Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities available, is added to the above list of briefing slides. As the crisis evolves the initial list of critical elements of information is expanded and tailored to the specific situation.<sup>43</sup>

FORSCOM: The FORSCOM headquarters does not maintain a standard CEI set for use during crisis situations. Rather, it develops new CEI criteria for each crisis based upon the crises' general situation. However, the following briefing subject list was utilized in virtually every DESERT SHIELD / STORM briefing provided to the CINCFOR, thus it provides an example of what the FORSCOM headquarters considers crisis action procedures CEI.<sup>44</sup>

a. Mobilization:

- 1) Total personnel mobilized.
- 2) Units alerted for mobilization.
- 3) Units arriving at mobilization stations.
- 4) Units rated C4 or below and actions taken to correct their readiness status.

5) Mobilization units by category (CONUS support or deployed).

b. Deployment:

- 1) Total personnel deployed (AC / RC).
- 2) Scheduled air deployments by units.
- 3) Projected air deployment by units.
- 4) Ships loading at SPOEs.
- 5) Ships arriving at SPODs.

c. Theater:

- 1) CINCCENT and COMUSARCENT priorities and requirements.
- 2) General troop dispositions.
- 3) Status of classes of supply.
- 4) Casualty reporting.

d. Re-deployment:

- 1) Total personnel remaining deployed (AC / RC).
- 2) Units remaining in SWA and projected re-deployment date.
- 3) Scheduled re-deployments.
- 4) Re-deployment timeliness.
- 5) Major subordinate unit closures.
- 6) Loading of ships at SWA SPOEs.
- 7) Arrival of ships at recovery SPODs.

e. Demobilization:

- 1) Total personnel demobilized.

2) Scheduled unit release from active duty date  
(REFRAD).

3) Projected unit REFRAD and actual unit REFRAD.

4) Reserve Component equipment readiness.

f. CONUS Operations:

1) Major subordinate unit mission capability  
assessment.

2) CONUS threat.

3) Employment of CONUS security forces.

LANTCOM: USCINCLANT's CEI can be found in Tab A, Appendix 7, Annex B to that command's OPOD 2000-90, which is USCINCLANT'S basic operation order format. That document provides an abbreviated crisis action checklist tailored around JOPS Volume IV, Annexes A through F. The USCINCLANT OPOD basic checklist is modified to fit each specific crisis situation. Still, the USCINCLANT OPOD format provides a basic / initial list of crisis action critical elements of information. When USCINCLANT utilized its OPOD format for the USCINCLANT administered FTX OCEAN VENTURE 92 the result was the following briefing slide / CEI list:

a. Situation.

b. Mission.

c. Available Courses of Action.

d. Recommended Course of Action.

e. Weather.

f. Operational Events During Last 24 Hours.

- g. Operational Events Scheduled For Next 24 Hours.
- h. Operational Issues.
- i. Logistics.
- j. Personnel.
- k. Public Affairs.
- l. Communications.
- m. Command Relationships.
- n. Forces Available.
- o. Medical.

PACOM: USCINCPAC does not have an established set of critical elements of information that are briefed to its CINC during initial crisis action procedures. While several arguments within the PACOM staff have been made to develop a generic briefing that would contain a standard set of critical information elements, the prevailing school of thought within that headquarters is that each crisis is unique, thus requiring unique CEI. Additionally, the current level of automation and technical support provided to every PACOM crisis action team allows for the rapid development of a set of briefing slides that are tailored specifically to the on-going crisis.<sup>45</sup> However, a recently utilized PACOM CEI list, such as the following, should provide an example of that headquarter's CEI preferences:<sup>46</sup>

- a. Personnel "Scoreboard:" Personnel by command in theater and enroute.
- b. Diagram of Area of Operation.



c. Deployment Status: Aircraft / Ship locations and missions.

d. Arrivals Status: Aircraft / ship arrival locations and missions.

e. Significant Actions Completed.

f. Issues.

g. In Country Cargo Support: Cumulative sorties completed and cargo tons transported by type aircraft / ship.

h. Next Phase Review: Review of actions scheduled for next phase of operation.

i. Re-deployment Plan.

SOUTHCOM: SOUTHCOM Headquarters maintains a succinct and SOP documented crisis action CEI list which is modified little if any during the evolution of a crisis situation.<sup>47</sup> The SOUTHCOM CEI list is as follows:

a. Task Organization:

- 1) Friendly Force Status.
- 2) Friendly Disposition and Capabilities.

b. Situation:

- 1) Weather.
- 2) Intelligence Update.
- 3) Political / Military Situation.
- 4) Medical Situation.
- 5) Legal Update.
- 6) Public Affairs.
- 7) Start-Up Actions.

c. Mission:

- 1) Mission.
- 2) CINC's Intent.

d. Execution:

- 1) Significant Events.
- 2) Future Operations.
- 3) Decision Points.

e. Service Support:

- 1) Personnel Update.
- 2) Logistics Update.

f. Command and Signal:

- 1) Command.
- 2) Communications.

g. Taskings / Wrap-Up:

- 1) Tasking update / Task Assignment.
- 2) Meetings / Special Activities.

USFK: United States Forces Korea / Combined Forces Command (USFK / CFC) Headquarters monitors and remains prepared to brief several "critical indicators" of daily North Korean activity.

USFK / CFC also maintains an execution list of its "Crisis Action System Operating Procedures (CASOP)" which is strictly a list of procedural steps to be complied with upon the initiation of a major military crisis upon the Korean peninsula. Both lists are classified Secret. During the initiation of crisis action procedures, USFK / CFC critical elements of information consist of the current "critical indicators" (intelligence) and the

current CASOP execution status. Crisis Action Team briefings are verbal with the only visuals used being maps, and to a lesser degree, slides listing the status of CASOP execution.<sup>48</sup> Thus, USFK / CFC initial crisis CEI are far more situation dependent than any other Unified Command. However, the USFK / CFC staff is currently developing, with the aid of a defense contractor, a mini-computer driven decision support system named "Armistice Decision Support (ADS) / CINC's Critical Information Requirements (CIR) System." While this highly automated and technically sophisticated system is designed primarily for war fighting decision support, when completed it will also provide the most comprehensive and detailed crisis action procedure information of any Unified Headquarters. While the ADS / CIR system is still in the developmental stage, an example list of its information component is as follows:<sup>49</sup>

a. CFC Centers of Gravity:

- 1) Strategic.
- 2) Operational.
- 3) Tactical.

b. Impact of Courses of Action on CFC and North Korean Centers of Gravity:

- 1) Strategic.
- 2) Operational.
- 3) Tactical.

**c. Effects of Courses of Actions with associated Branches  
and Sequels.**

- 1) Forces Adequate.
- 2) Time ... Execution.
- 3) Time ... Reaction.
- 4) Relative Combat Power.
- 5) Intelligence.
- 6) Logistics.
- 7) Enemy Losses.
- 8) Friendly Losses.
- 9) Risk / Payoff.
- 10) Weather.
- 11) Political / Military / Economic.
- 12) Ground Dimension.
- 13) Air Dimension.
- 14) Sea Dimension.
- 15) Predicted Outcome.

**d. CINC guidance and priorities:**

- 1) Maneuver.
- 2) Target Attacks.
- 3) Air Defense.
- 4) Theater Reserves.
- 5) Unit Status.
- 6) Logistics.
- 7) Air Support.
- 8) Fire Support.

- 9) Intelligence.
  - 10) Joint / Combined Surveillance / Reconnaissance.
  - 11) Political.
- e. Command Relationships.

#### CRISIS DECISION QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS

A national level crisis consists of surprise, the unanticipated, and the unique, and thereby produces a variety of psychological challenges for key governmental decision makers during their managing of crisis response activities.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, crises induced stress can degrade personnel decision quality at every level of the chain of command. If a person's stress or anxiety level is too high, that person will be panicky and frantic about the problem; he will engage in desperate moves just to get out of the situation as quickly as possible. Conversely, if stress or anxiety is too low, the person will not employ his full intellectual potential in addressing the crisis situation. Decision making under crisis induced stress requires, more than anything else, an awareness of what is going on - an attitude of vigilance. Thus, the correct psychological response to crisis induced stress is "vigilant concentration" focused to produce an adaptive, fluid response thereby raising the probability of achieving high-quality, well-balanced, stable decisions.<sup>51</sup>

Similar to their effects upon individuals, national crises will also disrupt basic patterns in governmental agency and

military staff planning and response implementation. U.S. government inter-agency, political, and diplomatic administrative processes which normally require months are suddenly attempted in days or even hours. There should be no surprise when such expedited administrative actions fail to produce as required by crisis action procedures. In fact, between 1946 and 1976 the four greatest delayers of U.S. military actions during national crisis have been the following (See APPENDIX D, Delays in National-Level Crisis Management):

- a. Consideration of international impact (diplomatic coordination).
- b. U.S. presidential delay in reaching a decision (political coordination).
- c. Constraints on military action (legal review / due process).
- d. U.S. government inter-agency coordination.

Obviously, even the most senior levels of leadership are subject to stress induced thought process errors when confronted by a crisis situation. Furthermore, during the above mentioned period, NCA and senior military command and staff decision errors and delays during national-level crisis action procedures maintained a steady or even slightly increasing rate of occurrence.<sup>32</sup> As the above observations concerning crisis decision quality strongly suggest, commanders and staff officers involved in national level crisis action procedures must plan for and expect the top levels of national civilian and military

authority to at least infrequently fail to provide timely guidance.

The above considerations of crises induced stress strongly suggests that the quantity of information provided to decision makers during crisis action procedures must not be so large as to further increase their levels of anxiety and stress. CAP decisions must be based upon the minimum quantity of information that permits both thorough staff actions and commander consideration. Too much information, and data that is too detailed and too comprehensive, produces a crisis in simply preparing and mentally digesting the information. Thus, when CAP CEI lists are developed, strictly those information topics should be listed which can be quickly and accurately communicated, and which directly and effectively describe the parameters of the problem and its possible resolutions.

#### MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS

The increasingly powerful institution of the international media must be contemplated throughout the crisis action procedures process. As exceptionally well demonstrated by the media reporting of the Viet Nam War's 1968 Tet offensive, the media's power is potentially so pervasive that it can turn a U.S. tactical or operational victory into a strategic defeat. At a minimum, media coverage of U.S. military capabilities, plans, and force movements can provide an enemy with exceptionally valuable strategic and tactical intelligence.

The news media increasingly considers itself international in citizenship, and responsible for reporting to and for all the world. The success or failure of any one nation's military operations has neither citizenship nor patriotic significance to the media. This is especially true for the major American news networks which have evolved into multi-national corporations obtaining a significant portion of their revenues from the international market.

Of further concern to the NCA and the U.S. military during a crisis situation is the existence of a media elite which is institutionally anti-military. The existence of a media elite has been proven in a number of published studies which also proves that the media elite possesses a particular political and social predisposition that places it distinctly left of center on the American spectrum. Moreover, the media elite enjoys a monopoly on news-gathering and reporting, channeled through a corporate structure that gives both the media elite and media corporations immense power in the American political system.<sup>53</sup> Consequently, during crisis action procedures every political, diplomatic, and military decision must be made with the assumption that the media will learn of it within some limited / finite time frame. What the media will do with diplomatic and military secrets, or any information relating to a national crisis circumstance, is problematic. However, the majority of journalists perceive a world that is "peopled by brutal soldiers, corrupt businessmen, and struggling underdogs."<sup>54</sup> Furthermore,



media reports will more often than not be presented from a negative perspective, for as one American network journalist stated during his coverage of the El Salvador insurgency "good news isn't news."<sup>55</sup>

The U.S. military cannot, and indeed should not, lie to, attempt to manipulate, nor treat the media with malice. A free press is part of what America stands for, and is part of what the U.S. military is sworn to defend. The press is not an enemy, but it is a constant and major threat to a crisis resolution favorable to the United States, and should be provided the same level of consideration as an enemy's military force. Therefore, all crisis action procedures should include media considerations. In addition to always developing crisis response plans with the media's potential to harm U.S. military operations thoroughly in mind, as operational security and classification factors permit, the media should be kept informed throughout the execution of crisis action procedures for the following minimum reasons:

- a. There is a better chance to be proactive rather than reactive.
- b. There is a better chance of controlling the message.
- c. There is a 100 percent better chance of correcting misinformation than if the media is not informed.
- d. Not informing the media sometimes will make the U.S. Government look to be not in control of a crisis situation.<sup>56</sup>

From the above it appears obvious that the media must be included in any list of critical elements of information relating to crisis action procedures.

A "TYPICAL" STRATEGIC / OPERATIONAL LEVEL CEI LIST

After reviewing all of the crisis action briefing lists submitted by the NMCC and responding unified command headquarters, the following 20 generic CEI titles were developed.

- 1) BACKGROUND: Intelligence and / or historical information concerning the crisis situation of a non-immediate nature.
- 2) CASUALTY STATUS / MEDICAL: Casualty statistics and medical planning or problem considerations.
- 3) CENTERS OF GRAVITY: Strategic, operational, and tactical centers of gravity.
- 4) COMMANDER'S INTENT: Commander's intent, both presidential and supported commander, and specified missions.
- 5) COMMUNICATIONS: All matters concerning strategic and operational communication systems.
- 6) DIPLOMATIC: Diplomatic considerations.
- 7) FORCE LIST / TASK ORG: Task organizations, command relationships, and forces both designated for actual and possible employment.
- 8) FRIENDLY SITUATION: All aspects of U.S. and allied forces involved in the supported commander's OPLAN.

- 9) INTELLIGENCE: All intelligence considerations available from all sources, including weather.
- 10) LOGISTICS: All logistics related plans, problems, statistics, and projections.
- 11) MEDIA: All media considerations including public relations.
- 12) MESSAGE TRAFFIC: Incoming and outgoing message traffic.
- 13) MISCELLANEOUS: All NCA / Unified Command briefing topics not addressed by one of the other generic titles in this list.
- 14) OPLAN OUTLINE: A brief summary of strategic and operational CONPLANS, OPLANs, and OPORDs.
- 15) PERSONNEL: Personnel problems, statistics, and management plans.
- 16) POLITICAL / LEGAL: All U.S. national political and legal considerations relevant to the subject crisis, including considerations of the War Powers Act.
- 17) REQUIRED IMMEDIATE ACTION: Staff, unit, or military action requiring immediate execution.
- 18) SCHEDULING: Schedules for both completed and pending activities including achieved and projected results.
- 19) SITUATION ANALYSIS: Staff analysis of all types and levels of plans.
- 20) UNIT STATUS: All reports and statistics relating to unit combat readiness.

Applying the most appropriate generic CEI title to each NMCC / Unified Command briefing topic resulted in the following statistical record of CEI generic titles with corresponding frequency of occurrence:

a. NMCC (NCA/CJCS):

	<u>CEI TYPE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
1)	BACKGROUND .....	2	13.3%
2)	DIPLOMATIC .....	1	6.7
3)	FRIENDLY SITUATION .....	2	13.3
4)	INTELLIGENCE .....	1	6.7
5)	LOGISTICS .....	1	6.7
6)	MEDIA .....	1	6.7
7)	MESSAGE TRAFFIC .....	2	13.3
8)	MISCELLANEOUS .....	1	6.7
9)	OPLAN OUTLINE .....	1	6.7
10)	PERSONNEL .....	1	6.7
11)	POLITICAL / LEGAL .....	1	6.7
12)	SITUATION ANALYSIS .....	1	6.7
		----	-----
		15	100.0%

b. CENTCOM:

	<u>CEI TYPE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
1)	COMMUNICATIONS .....	1	20.0%
2)	FRIENDLY SITUATION .....	1	20.0
3)	INTELLIGENCE .....	1	20.0

4)	MISCELLANEOUS .....	1	20.0
5)	REQUIRED IMMEDIATE ACTION ...	1	20.0
		----	-----
		5	100.0%

c. FORSCOM:

	<u>CEI TYPE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
1)	CASUALTY STATUS / MEDICAL ..	1	3.5
2)	COMMANDER'S INTENT .....	1	3.5
3)	FORCE LIST / TASK ORG .....	4	13.8
4)	FRIENDLY SITUATION .....	1	3.5
5)	INTELLIGENCE .....	1	3.5
6)	LOGISTICS .....	1	3.5
7)	OPLAN OUTLINE .....	1	3.5
8)	PERSONNEL .....	4	13.8
9)	SCHEDULING .....	12	41.4
10)	UNIT STATUS .....	3	10.5
		----	-----
		29	100.0%

d. LANTCOM:

	<u>CEI TYPE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
1)	CASUALTY STATUS / MEDICAL ...	1	5.6%
2)	COMMANDER'S INTENT .....	1	5.6
3)	COMMUNICATIONS .....	1	5.6
4)	FORCE LIST / TASK ORG .....	2	11.1
5)	FRIENDLY SITUATION .....	1	5.6
6)	INTELLIGENCE .....	2	11.1

7)	LOGISTICS .....	1	5.6
8)	MEDIA .....	1	5.6
9)	MISCELLANEOUS .....	1	5.6
10)	OPLAN OUTLINE .....	3	16.7
11)	PERSONNEL .....	1	5.6
12)	SCHEDULING .....	2	11.1
13)	SITUATION ANALYSIS .....	1	5.6
		----	-----
		18	100.0%

e. PACOM:

	<u>CEI TYPE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
1)	LOGISTICS .....	1	8.3%
2)	MISCELLANEOUS .....	1	8.3
3)	OPLAN OUTLINE .....	3	25.0
4)	PERSONNEL .....	1	8.3
5)	SCHEDULING .....	4	33.3
6)	SITUATION ANALYSIS .....	2	16.7
		----	-----
		12	100.0%

f. SOUTHCOM:

	<u>CEI TYPE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
1)	CASUALTY STATUS / MEDICAL ...	1	4.8%
2)	COMMANDER'S INTENT .....	1	4.8
3)	COMMUNICATIONS .....	1	4.8
4)	FORCE LIST / TASK ORG .....	1	4.8
5)	FRIENDLY SITUATION .....	2	9.5

6)	INTELLIGENCE .....	2	9.5
7)	LOGISTICS .....	1	4.8
8)	MEDIA .....	1	4.8
9)	OPLAN OUTLINE .....	4	19.1
10)	PERSONNEL .....	1	4.8
11)	POLITICAL / LEGAL .....	2	9.5
12)	SCHEDULING .....	4	19.1
		----	-----
		21	100.0%

g. USFK:

	<u>CEI TYPE</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
1)	CASUALTY STATUS / MEDICAL ...	1	2.3%
2)	CENTERS OF GRAVITY .....	3	6.8
3)	COMMANDER'S INTENT .....	11	25.0
4)	FORCE LIST / TASK ORG .....	2	4.6
5)	INTELLIGENCE .....	5	11.4
6)	LOGISTICS .....	2	4.8
7)	OPLAN OUTLINE .....	5	11.4
8)	POLITICAL / LEGAL .....	2	4.8
9)	SCHEDULING .....	2	4.8
10)	SITUATION ANALYSIS .....	10	22.7
11)	UNIT STATUS .....	1	2.3
		----	-----
		44	100.0%

The following summaries of the NCA / CJCS and unified command generic CEI titles list topics of greatest interest to those headquarters, and discloses a difference between what the NCA / CJCS considers important CAP CEI topics compared to the

unified commands. The NCA / CJCS is most interested in "what" is happening while the unified commands are most interested in "how" they will resolve their theater's crisis. However, since a Unified Command must provide continuous situation update reports to the NCA / CJCS during CAP, those CEI items of priority to the NCA / CJCS would also be of priority to the Unified Command.

a. Most frequently listed CEI generic titles; NCA / CJCS:

- 1) COMMANDER'S INTENT ..... 25.0%
- 2) SITUATION ANALYSIS ..... 22.7
- 3) INTELLIGENCE ..... 11.4
- 4) OPLAN OUTLINE ..... 11.4

-----

70.5%

b. Most frequently listed CEI generic titles; Unified Commands:

- 1) SCHEDULING ..... 16.7%
- 2) OPLAN OUTLINE ..... 11.8
- 3) COMMANDER'S INTENT ..... 9.7
- 4) SITUATION ANALYSIS ..... 9.7
- 5) INTELLIGENCE ..... 8.3
- 6) FORCE LIST / TASK ORG ..... 6.3

-----

62.5%



## CONCLUSION

A "typical" example of the critical elements of information required / employed by United States unified command headquarters should address to varying degrees the following:

a. The key elements of the three most important messages a unified command will transmit during the initial phases of crisis action procedures:

- 1) Evaluation Request.
- 2) Commander's Estimate.
- 3) Operation order.

b. The most critical NCA / CJCS CEI.

c. The most common Unified Command CEI.

d. Media considerations.

e. Critical strategic scheduling considerations.

f. No excess information, and no degree of detail that does not contribute directly to problem resolution. The CEI list must be as efficient as possible.

Lastly, in compiling a "typical" crisis action procedures CEI list, focus must be maintained as to the purpose of the list. Providing time is available, information from a typical CEI list could certainly be utilized in the development of a formal Staff Estimate. CEI list information could also contribute to the formulation of a Theater Campaign Plan. However, the focus of the CEI list must remain initial crisis action procedures. Staff Estimates and Campaign Plans require formal staff procedures and lengths of time that go beyond the initial stages of a crisis.

Thus the format used for the CEI listing cannot be made to conform with either the Staff Estimate or the Campaign Plan formats. This is obvious by comparing the generic CEI titles most often employed by the Unified Commands against the information titles within both the Staff Estimate and Campaign Plan formats. Therefore, the format for a "typical" crisis action procedures CEI list will be unique, designed strictly to provide information for immediate command decisions and to determine what formal staff planning if any should be initiated. Utilizing the above guidelines, eliminating redundancy, and organizing the CEI titles in a logical manner produces the following Unified Command CEI topic list [Source of / requirement for title in brackets<sup>1</sup>] (See APPENDIX E, Briefing Slide Formats).

a. Situation [CE] [ER] [OO]

- 1) Initial incident
- 2) Current incident status
- 3) Current response actions

b. Intelligence [NCA] [UC]

- 1) Theater related
- 2) Outside theater related

---

1. CEI Title Source / Requirement:

- NCA - NCA
- UC - Unified Command
- ER - Evaluation Request
- CE - Commander's Estimate
- OO - Operation Order
- M - Media considerations
- SS - Strategic scheduling considerations

- 3) Weather
  - a) Enroute to theater
  - b) Within theater
- c. Enemy capabilities [ER]
  - 1) Land
  - 2) Air
  - 3) Sea
  - 4) Strategic
- d. Enemy COAs [CE]
  - 1) Enemy COA 1
  - 2) Enemy COA 2
  - 3) Enemy COA 3
- e. Operational constraints [ER]
  - 1) Current
  - 2) Projected
- f. Situation Analysis [NCA] [UC]
  - 1) Strategic / operational objective(s) [ER]
    - a) Strategic objective(s)
    - b) Operational objective(s)
  - 2) Mission(s) & Commander's Intent
    - a) Theater Mission(s) [CE] [OO]
    - b) Presidential Intent [NCA]
    - c) Theater Commander's Intent [UC]
- g. Course of Action development [ER] [CE]
  - 1) Possible COAs
    - a) COA 1

- b) COA 2
    - c) COA 3
  - 2) Comparison of possible COAs
    - a) COA 1
    - b) COA 2
    - c) COA 3
  - 3) Recommended COA
- h. Response Decision (OPLAN outline [NCA] [UC]):
  - 1) Concept of Operation [OO]
  - 2) Force List / Task Org [UC] [OO]
    - a) Ground Component
    - b) Air Component
    - c) Sea Component
    - d) SOF Component
  - 3) Tasking Assignments [OO]
  - 4) Mobility and Transportation [OO]
    - a) Intra-theater
      - (1) Land
      - (2) Air
      - (3) Sea
    - b) Inter-theater
      - (1) Land
      - (2) Sea
    - c) Ports of Debarkation
      - (1) Air
      - (2) Sea

- 5) Scheduling [SS] [UC] [OO]
  - a) N-Day
  - b) M-Day
  - c) C-Day
  - d) L-Hour
  - e) D-Day
  - f) H-Hr
  - g) Force arrivals
    - (1) Air (next 7 days)
    - (2) Sea (next 30 days)
- 6) Rules of Engagement [OO]
  - a) Current
  - b) Projected
- 7) Media considerations [M]
  - a) Current media knowledge
  - b) Projected media knowledge
  - c) Media cooperation actions
    - (1) Current
    - (2) Projected
- 8) Public Affairs [OO]
  - a) Current release
  - b) Projected release
- i. Personnel & Logistics
  - 9) Personnel [UC]
  - 10) Unit logistics status (Supply / Maintenance) [UC]
    - a) Ground Component


- b) Air Component
- c) Sea Component
- d) SOF Component

j. Communications [OO]

- 1) Satellite availability (Military / Commercial)
  - (1) Communications
  - (2) Navigation
  - (3) Weather
- 2) Satellite launch availability

# APPENDIX A

## CRISIS ACTION PROCEDURES DIAGRAM



APPENDIX B-1

CRITIC OPREP-3 PINNACLE EXAMPLE FORMAT<sup>2</sup>

PRECEDENCE  
FROM  
TO  
INFO  
CLASSIFICATION

GENTEXT / COMMAND ASSESSMENT

CURRENT SITUATION  
ACTION BEING TAKEN WITHIN CONSTRAINTS OF CURRENT ROE  
READILY AVAILABLE FORCES  
TIME FRAME FOR EARLIEST COMMITMENT OF FORCES  
MAJOR CONSTRAINTS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

---

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff PUB 5-02.4, Joint Operation Planning System, Volume IV, 8 July 1988.



APPENDIX B-2

JCS WARNING ORDER EXAMPLE FORMAT<sup>3</sup>

PRECEDENCE

FROM

TO

INFO

DISTRIBUTION

CLASSIFICATION

GENTEXT / SITUATION

GENTEXT / MISSION

GENTEXT / EXECUTION

COURSES OF ACTION

OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE

PSYOP GUIDANCE

INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

TENTATIVE M-DAY AND F-HOUR

TENTATIVE C-DAY AND L-HOUR

ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION

DEFCON AND DEPLOYABILITY POSTURE

GENTEXT / ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

TRANSPORT

AIRLIFT

SEALIFT

FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS

KNOWN LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS

CODE WORD ASSIGNED THIS OPERATION

CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE

PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

GENTEXT / COMMAND AND SIGNAL

COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

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Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff PUB 5-02.4, Joint Operation Planning System, Volume IV, 8 July 1988.

APPENDIX B-3

EVALUATION REQUEST EXAMPLE FORMAT

PRECEDENCE  
FROM  
TO  
INFO  
DISTRIBUTION  
CLASSIFICATION

1. OPERATION DESCRIPTION REFERENCE
2. NARRATIVE

TASKING  
SITUATION  
FACTORS AFFECTING POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION  
ENEMY CAPABILITIES  
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

GENERAL  
COURSES OF ACTION PLANNING PARAMETERS

COA 1  
COA 2  
COA 3  
COA 4

OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

3. OBJECTIVE
4. REMARKS

---

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff PUB 5-02.4, Joint Operation Planning System, Volume IV, 8 July 1988.

APPENDIX B-4

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE EXAMPLE FORMAT<sup>5</sup>

PRECEDENCE  
FROM  
TO  
INFO  
DISTRIBUTION  
CLASSIFICATION  
SUBJECT  
REFERENCES

MISSION

SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION

SITUATION  
OWN COAs  
ENEMY COAs  
COMPARISON OF OWN COAs  
RECOMMENDED COA  
REMARKS

---

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff PUB 5-02.4, Joint Operation Planning System, Volume IV, 8 July 1988.

APPENDIX B-5

JCS PLANNING ORDER EXAMPLE FORMAT<sup>6</sup>

PRECEDENCE  
FROM  
TO  
INFO  
DISTRIBUTION  
CLASSIFICATION

GENTEXT / SITUATION

GENTEXT / MISSION

GENTEXT / EXECUTION

COURSE OF ACTION  
OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE  
PSYOP GUIDANCE  
INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE  
COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS  
PROPOSED C-DAY AND L-HOUR  
TARGET DATE FOR EXECUTION  
ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION  
KNOWN OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

GENTEXT / ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

TRANSPORT  
AIRLIFT ASSETS ALLOCATED  
SEALIFT ASSETS ALLOCATED  
FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS  
KNOWN LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS  
UNCLASSIFIED NICKNAME FOR THIS OPERATION  
CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE  
PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

GENTEXT / COMMAND AND SIGNAL

COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE  
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

---

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff PUB 5-02.4, Joint Operation Planning System, Volume IV, 8 July 1988.

APPENDIX B-6

JCS ALERT ORDER EXAMPLE FORMAT<sup>7</sup>

PRECEDENCE  
FROM  
TO  
INFO  
DISTRIBUTION  
CLASSIFICATION

GENTEXT / SITUATION

GENTEXT / MISSION

GENTEXT / EXECUTION

COURSE OF ACTION  
MAJOR COMBAT FORCES PROVIDED  
OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE  
PSYOP GUIDANCE  
INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE  
OTHER COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS  
PROPOSED C-DAY AND L-HOUR  
TARGET DATE FOR EXECUTION  
COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

GENTEXT / ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

TRANSPORT  
AIRLIFT MOVEMENT PRIORITY  
AIRLIFT ASSETS ALLOCATED  
SEALIFT ASSETS ALLOCATED  
FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS  
KNOWN LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS  
CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE  
PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

GENTEXT / COMMAND AND SIGNAL

COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE  
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

---

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff PUB 5-02.4, Joint Operation Planning System, Volume IV, 8 July 1988.

APPENDIX B-7

DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER EXAMPLE FORMAT<sup>8</sup>

PRECEDENCE  
FROM  
TO  
INFO  
DISTRIBUTION  
CLASSIFICATION

GENTEXT / SITUATION

SEE JCS WARNING ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER // GENTEXT / MISSION  
SEE JCS WARNING ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER // GENTEXT /

EXECUTION

USCINXXXX PREPARES TO EXECUTE DEPLOYMENT IAW USCINXXXX  
OPLAN XXXX

USCINTRANS IS AUTHORIZED TO MOVE AIRCRAFT AND STAGE AIR  
CREWS TO SUPPORT ALERT STATUS ABOVE

OPSEC DESCRIPTION GUIDANCE

PSYOP GUIDANCE

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

DURATION OF OPERATION

USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS AS  
REQUESTED BY SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS  
DIRLAUTH ALCON

GENTEXT / ADMIN AND LOG

ADMIN: SEE JCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER

LOG: SEE JCS WARNING OR PLANNING ORDER

---

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff PUB 5-02.4, Joint Operation  
Planning System, Volume IV, 8 July 1988.

APPENDIX B-8

JCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER EXAMPLE FORMAT<sup>9</sup>

PRECEDENCE  
FROM  
TO  
INFO  
DISTRIBUTION  
CLASSIFICATION

GENTEXT / SITUATION

SEE JCS WARNING ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER

GENTEXT / MISSION

SEE JCS WARNING ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER

GENTEXT / EXECUTION

BEGIN DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AS DEFINED IN USCINCXXXX OPLAN  
XXXX

OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE

PSYOP GUIDANCE

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

C-DAY, L-HOUR: XXXXXXZ XXX XX

DURATION OF OPERATION

USTRANSCOM WILL COORDINATE AND / OR MONITOR DEPLOYMENTS  
AS REQUIRED BY SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING COMMANDERS  
DIRLAUTH ALCON

GENTEXT / ADMIN AND LOG

SEE JCS WARNING ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER CMD AND SIGNAL  
SEE JCS WARNING ORDER OR PLANNING ORDER ADMIN AND LOG

---

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff PUB 5-02.4, Joint Operation  
Planning System, Volume IV, 8 July 1988.

APPENDIX B-9

SUPPORTED COMMANDER'S OPERATION ORDER EXAMPLE FORMAT<sup>10</sup>

PRECEDENCE

FROM

TO

INFO

CLASSIFICATION

TIME ZONE

HEADING / TASK ORGANIZATION

GENTEXT / SITUATION

GENTEXT / MISSION

GENTEXT / EXECUTION

CONCEPT OF OPERATION

TASKING ASSIGNMENTS

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

D-DAY AND H-HOUR

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

GENTEXT / ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

MOBILITY / TRANSPORTATION

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

GENTEXT / COMMAND AND SIGNAL

COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

---

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff PUB 5-02.4, Joint Operation Planning System, Volume IV, 8 July 1988.



APPENDIX B-10

JCS EXECUTION ORDER EXAMPLE FORMAT<sup>11</sup>

PRECEDENCE  
FROM  
TO  
CLASSIFICATION

GENTEXT / SITUATION

GENTEXT / MISSION

GENTEXT / EXECUTION

COURSE OF ACTION  
MAJOR COMBAT FORCES PROVIDED  
OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE  
PSYOP GUIDANCE  
COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS  
EXECUTION DATE  
DURATION OF OPERATIONS GUIDANCE  
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

GENTEXT / ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

TRANSPORT  
    AIRLIFT ASSETS ALLOCATED  
    SEALIFT ASSETS ALLOCATED  
FUND CITATION  
PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA  
CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE  
KNOWN LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS  
PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

GENTEXT / COMMAND AND SIGNAL

COMMUNICATIONS GUIDANCE  
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

---

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff PUB 5-02.4, Joint Operation Planning System, Volume IV, 8 July 1988.

## APPENDIX C

### JCS CEI EXAMPLE NMCC BRIEFING OUTLINE - OPERATION DESERT STORM<sup>57</sup>

1. Summary of Key Events.
2. Significant Enemy Activity.
3. CINC's Assessment.
4. 24 Hour CW / BW Activity.
5. SRBM Fixed Sites / Launchers.
6. Air Concept of Operations.
7. Strategic Operations. Target Area Emphasis.
8. Strategic Target Summary.
9. Tactical Air Operations.
10. SEAD. Enemy Air Defense Status.
11. Air Defense Operations.
12. Enemy Offensive Air Operations.
13. Allied Air Operations.
14. Enemy Aircraft Status and Sorties.
15. U.S. Aircraft Status and Sorties.
16. U.S. and Allied Aircraft on Alert.
17. U.S. Air Forces in Theater.
18. Air Objective.
19. Air Concept of Operations.
20. Naval Objectives. Naval Concept of Operations.
21. Allied Naval Objectives. Allied Naval Concepts of Operations.
22. Enemy Naval Operations / Facilities / Status.

APPENDIX C (CONTINUED)

JCS CEI EXAMPLE  
NMCC BRIEFING OUTLINE - OPERATION DESERT STORM<sup>88</sup>

23. Maritime Interceptions.
24. NAVCENT Losses. NAVCENT Forces in Theater.
25. Naval Objectives Next 24 Hours. Naval Concept of Operations.
26. Ground Objective. Ground Operations. Ground Concept of Operations.
27. U.S. Ground Operations. Enemy Ground Operations. Allied Ground Operations.
28. Enemy Personnel Strength / Losses.
29. Enemy Tanks / APCs / Artillery.
30. Enemy Reinforcements.
31. ARCENT Forces Status. MARCENT Forces Status.
32. ARCENT Equipment Status. MARCENT Equipment Status.
33. Ground Objective Next 24 Hours. Ground concept of Operations.
34. SOF Objectives. SOF Disposition. SOF Concept of Operations.
35. SOF Operations. SOCCENT Forces Status.
36. SOF Objectives Next 24 Hours.
37. Counter-Terrorist Operations.
38. CINC THREATCON Status. CINC Security Posture.
39. Theater Weather.
40. Daily Personnel Status. Total Casualties. Reserve Component Status.
41. Scheduled Deployments. Forces Enroute. Sustaining the Force (Water, Food, Fuel, Medical, Ammunition).
42. Anticipated Enemy Activity.
43. USCINCCENT Concerns.

## APPENDIX D

### PERCENTAGE OF OCCURRENCE DECISION-MAKING DELAYS IN NATIONAL-LEVEL CRISIS MANAGEMENT (101 NATIONAL CRISIS, 1946-1976)<sup>59</sup>

#### 1. System-Related Delays in Decision-Making / Action:

Delayed decision on action:	38.6
Delayed transmission of orders:	5.0
Delays due to extensive inter-agency coordination:	54.5
Delays due to legal concurrence requirements:	10.9
Delays due to international agency referral requirements:	38.6
Presidential decision delays:	78.2

#### 2. System / Procedural Constraints on Action:

Security / sensitivity issues:	17.8
Misperception of constraints:	5.0
Constraints on military action:	65.3
Consideration of U.S. domestic impact:	28.7
Consideration of international impact:	83.2
Proposed action produces domestic policy conflict:	24.8
Proposed action produces international policy conflict:	47.5

APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

PERCENTAGE OF OCCURRENCE  
DECISION-MAKING DELAYS IN NATIONAL-LEVEL CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
(101 NATIONAL CRISIS, 1946-1976)  
(Continued)

3. Legal issues involved:

Legality of proposed action  
is issue: 31.7

Presidential approval of action  
is legally required: 11.9

4. Resources for Decision-Making Action:

Inadequate communications  
facilities: 6.9

Inability to reinforce local  
units in time: 13.9

Inability to provide additional  
logistical support: 7.9

5. Intelligence Failures at Decision-Making Level:

Inadequate intelligence input: 22.3

Delay in securing intelligence: 28.7

Failure to recognize import of  
intelligence received: 22.8

6. Emotional / Ideological Issues involved in Decision-Making:

Crisis actions effected by  
ideological issues: 42.6

Crisis actions effected by  
emotional issues: 46.5

APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

PERCENTAGE OF OCCURRENCE  
DECISION-MAKING DELAYS IN NATIONAL-LEVEL CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
(101 NATIONAL CRISIS, 1946-1976)  
(Continued)

7. Interpersonal Factors in Decision-Making:

Multilingual problems:	5.9
Press relations / public information are significant factors:	48.5
Delay in contacting proper persons:	3.0
Distracted attention due to multiple crisis:	9.9

8. Prolonged Crisis Problems:

Boredom:	0.0
Fatigue:	0.0
Frustration:	9.9
Turn-over of key personnel:	5.0

9. Problems in Selecting Action Personnel:

Choice of commander and staff:	9.9
Sudden call-up / dispatch of troops:	27.7
Intermediate headquarters / chain of command problems:	6.9
No clear line of responsibility to a single commander:	4.0
Loss or transfer of key personnel:	4.0

## APPENDIX E

### UNIFIED COMMAND CEI BRIEFING SLIDES

#### **SITUATION**

**INITIAL INCIDENT:** Origin and nature of crisis situation, original constraints, initial response, and forecasted results if no response was provided.

**CURRENT INCIDENT STATUS:** Current status of crisis situation, current constraints, and projected schedule of crisis results with execution of current response plan and resources.

**CURRENT RESPONSE ACTIONS:** Forces immediately available, and scheduled for availability, for response implementation. Response actions on-going, scheduled, and requested for NCA approval.

#### **INTELLIGENCE**

**THEATER RELATED:** Crisis related intelligence data pertaining to the crisis theater.

**OUTSIDE THEATER RELATED:** Crisis related intelligence data pertaining to all theaters except the crisis theater.

#### **WEATHER:**

**ENROUTE TO THEATER:** Current and projected air and sea movement weather between supported and supporting commands.

**WITHIN THEATER:** Current and projected weather within crisis theater.

APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

UNIFIED COMMAND CEI BRIEFING SLIDES

<u>ENEMY CAPABILITIES</u>
<b>LAND:</b> Current and quickly reinforcing enemy land power capabilities.
<b>AIR:</b> Current and quickly reinforcing enemy air power capabilities.
<b>SEA:</b> Current and quickly reinforcing enemy sea power capabilities.
<b>STRATEGIC:</b> Current and quickly reinforcing enemy strategic bomber and missile, theater (tactical) missile, and all NBC warhead capabilities.

<u>ENEMY COAs</u>
<b>ENEMY COA 1:</b> Most probable enemy course of action with associated advantages and disadvantages for both the enemy and the supported command.
<b>ENEMY COA 2:</b> Second most probable enemy course of action with associated advantages and disadvantages for both the enemy and the supported command.
<b>ENEMY COA 3:</b> Third most probable enemy course of action with associated advantages and disadvantages for both the enemy and the supported command.



APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

UNIFIED COMMAND CEI BRIEFING SLIDES

**OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS**

**CURRENT:** Current force size / composition, ROE, and political constraints to response development / implementation.

**PROJECTED:** Projected force size / composition, ROE, and political constraints to response development / implementation.

**SITUATION ANALYSIS**

**STRATEGIC / OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE(S)**

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE(S):** U.S. strategic (political) objectives.

**OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE(S):** Supported command's operational objectives.

**MISSION(S) & COMMANDER'S INTENT**

**THEATER MISSION(S):** Operational missions assigned / implied to the supported command by the NCA.

**PRESIDENTIAL INTENT:** Self explanatory.

**THEATER COMMANDER'S INTENT:** Self explanatory.

APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

UNIFIED COMMAND CEI BRIEFING SLIDES

**COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT**

**POSSIBLE COAs**

COA 1: Concept of operation for supported command's Course of Action No. 1.

COA 2: Concept of operation for supported command's Course of Action No. 2.

COA 3: Concept of operation for supported command's Course of Action No. 3.

**COMPARISON OF POSSIBLE COAs**

COA 1: Advantages and disadvantages for both enemy and supported command of Course of Action No. 1.

COA 2: Advantages and disadvantages for both enemy and supported command of Course of Action No. 2.

COA 3: Advantages and disadvantages for both enemy and supported command of Course of Action No. 3.

**RECOMMENDED COA:** Self explanatory.

APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

UNIFIED COMMAND CEI BRIEFING SLIDES

<b>RESPONSE DECISION</b>
<b>CONCEPT OF OPERATION:</b> Expanded (greater detail) Concept of Operations for selected course of action.
<b>FORCE LIST / TASK ORG</b>  <b>GROUND COMPONENT:</b> Self explanatory.  <b>AIR COMPONENT:</b> Self explanatory.  <b>SEA COMPONENT:</b> Self explanatory.  <b>SOF COMPONENT:</b> Self explanatory.
<b>TASKING ASSIGNMENTS:</b> Taskings to specific force components, units, or supported command staff sections.

APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

UNIFIED COMMAND CEI BRIEFING SLIDES

**MOBILITY AND TRANSPORTATION**

**INTRA-THEATER**

**LAND:** Land transportation assets allocated / available to the supported command for inter-theater transportation.

**AIR:** Air transportation assets allocated / available to the supported command for inter-theater transportation.

**SEA:** Sea transportation assets allocated / available to the supported command for inter-theater transportation.

**INTER-THEATER**

**LAND:** Intra-theater land transportation assets assigned / available to the supported command.

**SEA:** Intra-theater land transportation assets assigned / available to the supported command.

**PORTS OF DEBARKATION**

**AIR:** Capacity / status of supported command's air PODs.

**SEA:** Capacity / status of supported command's sea PODs.

APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

UNIFIED COMMAND CEI BRIEFING SLIDES

**SCHEDULING**

**N-DAY:** Date for notification of agencies, forces, and personnel of their strategic deployment schedule.

**M-DAY:** Date for full or partial national mobilization.

**C-DAY:** Date for strategic deployment operations to begin.

**L-HOUR:** Hour of C-day for strategic deployment operations to begin.

**D-DAY:** Date for crisis response combat operations (OPORD execution) to begin.

**H-HR:** Hour of D-day for crisis response combat operations (OPORD execution) to begin.

**FORCE ARRIVALS**

**AIR (NEXT 7 DAYS):** Reinforcing forces arriving by air within next 7 days.

**SEA (NEXT 30 DAYS):** Reinforcing forces arriving by sea within next 30 days.

**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

**CURRENT:** Self explanatory.

**PROJECTED:** Self explanatory.

APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

UNIFIED COMMAND CEI BRIEFING SLIDES

**MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS**

**CURRENT MEDIA KNOWLEDGE:** Current media knowledge and reporting of crisis and response actions / plans.

**PROJECTED MEDIA KNOWLEDGE:** Projected media knowledge and reporting of crisis and response actions / plans.

**MEDIA COOPERATION ACTIONS**

**CURRENT:** Current PAO actions and policies for informing both the media and the U.S. population.

**PROJECTED:** Projected PAO actions and policies for informing both the media and the U.S. population.

**PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

**CURRENT RELEASE:** Summary of current official PAO release concerning crisis and response situation.

**PROJECTED RELEASE:** Summary of projected official PAO release concerning crisis and response situation.

APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

UNIFIED COMMAND CEI BRIEFING SLIDES

<u>PERSONNEL &amp; LOGISTICS</u>		
<b>PERSONNEL:</b> Current and projected personnel problems and serious situations.		
<u>UNIT LOGISTICS STATUS</u>	<u>SUPPLY</u>	<u>MAINTENANCE</u>
<b>GROUND COMPONENT:</b>	Percent fill	OR rate
<b>AIR COMPONENT:</b>	Percent fill	OR rate
<b>SEA COMPONENT:</b>	Percent fill	OR rate
<b>SOF COMPONENT:</b>	Percent fill	OR rate

<u>COMMUNICATIONS</u>
<b>SATELLITE AVAILABILITY (MILITARY / COMMERCIAL)</b>
<b>COMMUNICATIONS:</b> Type / number of channels available with coverage times for both inter- and intra- theater satellite communications.
<b>NAVIGATION:</b> Accuracy and coverage times for navigation satellites providing intra-theater support.
<b>WEATHER:</b> Coverage times for weather satellites providing intra-theater support.
<b>SATELLITE LAUNCH AVAILABILITY:</b> Type and response times of theater support satellite available for launch on request.

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